Observation and Distinction. Representing Information in Infinite Games

We compare two approaches for modelling imperfect information in infinite games by using finite-state automata. The first, more standard approach views information as the result of an observation process driven by a sequential Mealy machine. In contrast, the second approach features indistinguishability relations described by synchronous two-tape automata. The indistinguishability-relation model turns out to be strictly more expressive than the one based on observations. We present a characterisation of the indistinguishability relations that admit a representation as a finite-state observation function. We show that the characterisation is decidable, and give a procedure to construct a corresponding Mealy machine whenever one exists

Infinite games with finite knowledge gaps

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning strategies can be constructed effectively without restricting the direction of information flow. Instead, our condition requires that the players attain common knowledge about the actual state of the game over and over again along every play. We show that it is decidable whether a given game satisfies the condition, and prove tight complexity bounds for the strategy synthesis problem under $\omega$-regular winning conditions given by parity automata.Comment: 39 pages; 2nd revision; submitted to Information and Computatio

Games with recurring certainty

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are known to be intractable, unless the information flow is severely restricted. Examples of undecidable cases typically feature a situation where players become uncertain about the current state of the game, and this uncertainty lasts forever. Here we consider games where the players attain certainty about the current state over and over again along any play. For finite-state games, we note that this kind of recurring certainty implies a stronger condition of periodic certainty, that is, the events of state certainty ultimately occur at uniform, regular intervals. We show that it is decidable whether a given game presents recurring certainty, and that, if so, the problem of synthesising coordination strategies under w-regular winning conditions is solvable.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2014, arXiv:1404.041

Games with Delays. A Frankenstein Approach

We investigate infinite games on finite graphs where the information flow is perturbed by nondeterministic signalling delays. It is known that such perturbations make synthesis problems virtually unsolvable, in the general case. On the classical model where signals are attached to states, tractable cases are rare and difficult to identify. Here, we propose a model where signals are detached from control states, and we identify a subclass on which equilibrium outcomes can be preserved, even if signals are delivered with a delay that is finitely bounded. To offset the perturbation, our solution procedure combines responses from a collection of virtual plays following an equilibrium strategy in the instant- signalling game to synthesise, in a Frankenstein manner, an equivalent equilibrium strategy for the delayed-signalling game

Identification of a competing risks model with unknown transformations of latent failure times

This paper is concerned with identification of a competing risks model with unknown transformations of latent failure times. The model in this paper includes, as special cases, competing risks versions of proportional hazards, mixed proportional hazards, and accelerated failure time models. It is shown that covariate effects on latent failure times, cause-specific link functions, and the joint survivor function of the disturbance terms can be identified without relying on modelling the dependence between latent failure times parametrically nor using an exclusion restriction among covariates. As a result, the paper provides an identification result on the joint survivor function of the latent failure times conditional on covariates

Extensional and Intensional Strategies

This paper is a contribution to the theoretical foundations of strategies. We first present a general definition of abstract strategies which is extensional in the sense that a strategy is defined explicitly as a set of derivations of an abstract reduction system. We then move to a more intensional definition supporting the abstract view but more operational in the sense that it describes a means for determining such a set. We characterize the class of extensional strategies that can be defined intensionally. We also give some hints towards a logical characterization of intensional strategies and propose a few challenging perspectives